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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880062-CA 
v. : 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals on Petition of Certiorari. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly decide that 
defendant conceded the issue of consent? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly decide to 
remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
consent where voluntary consent vitiates a prior illegal stop? 
3. Did defendant waive his state constitutional claims 
by failing to articulate them to the Utah Court of Appeals? 
4. Should this Court adopt a standard similar to the 
federal standard under the state constitution? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of 
a controlled substance, a second degree felony. Judge Harding 
granted defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and the State 
filed an interlocutory appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals reversed Judge Harding's order granting 
suppression. This Court granted review on Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 15, 1987, Highway Patrol Trooper Paul 
Mangelson was driving southbound on Interstate 15 at about 4:00 
p.m. when he observed defendant's truck driving northbound near 
Nephi (R. 50). Mangelson may have observed that defendant's 
truck displayed out of state license plates (R. 50). He did 
observe that defendant was following the vehicle in front of him 
at a distance of about 3 or 4, possible 5 car lengths and he felt 
that distance was unsafe (R. 51). 
Mangelson turned through the median and pulled up to 
defendant's truck (R. 51, 52). Pulling alongside defendant, 
Mangelson estimated defendant's speed at approximately 50 miles 
per hour (R. 51). At that time, Mangelson also observed that 
defendant appeared to be Hispanic (R. 52). Because Mangelson 
still felt defendant was following too closely, he pulled 
defendant over (R. 53). 
Mangelson issued a citation to defendant for following 
too closely and for driving on an expired driver's license (R. 
5). At some point, defendant consented to Mangelson's subsequent 
Judge Harding found that Mangelson estimated the speed at 50 
miles per hour even though Mangelson testified that it was 50 to 
55 and defendant said he was travelling 54 miles per hour (T. 
169, 192, 195). 
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search of the truck (R. 53). Mangelson discovered approximately 
one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger door panel. He 
arrested defendant for possession of a controlled substance (R. 
6). 
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over 
to District court on the narcotics charge (R. 1-3). Defendant 
moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence claiming that 
Mangelson's traffic stop was pretextual for an investigative 
search of defendant's truck (R. 12-13). Judge Harding granted 
the motion to suppress and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and an Order suppressing the evidence on January 6, 1988 
(R. 49-55). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly determined that the 
record supports a finding that defendant conceded the issue of 
consent. Defendant never argued that his consent was coerced and 
he prepared a specific finding of fact that he did consent to the 
search. 
Given that defendant consented to the search, the prior 
illegality of the stop is vitiated in this case. There is no 
evidence of coercion of defendant's consent in the record. 
Defendant's claims to the contrary are mostly based upon a "but 
for" casual connection that has been rejected by the Tenth 
Circuit and the United State Supreme Court. 
Defendant conceded that he consented to the search, therefore, 
no details were presented after the facts surrounding the initial 
stop. Defendant challenged only the initial stop (R. 53, T. 
189). 
-3-
Defendant waived his opportunity to raise an analysis 
of the Utah Constitution in the Court of Appeals and should not 
be allowed to make his analysis for the first time in this Court. 
Even if this Court does reach the state constitutional argument, 
it need not suppress the evidence. A consent search is a 




THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE 
ISSUE OF CONSENT IS CORRECT. 
Defendant contends that the Utah Court of Appeals erred 
in its conclusion that the lower court found that defendant 
consented to the search of his vehicle. Specifically, he 
complains that his attorney never used the word "stipulate" and 
that the appellate court's opinion is in error because it states 
that counsel stipulated. Careful review of the trial court 
record and of the appellate court's opinion, however, supports a 
conclusion that defendant, in effect, stipulated that the search 
was consensual and that, given the lack of any claim of 
involuntariness, the consent was voluntary. 
Defendant correctly admits that the State attempted to 
present evidence on the issue of voluntary consent and that 
defense counsel objected claiming that the motion to suppress 
only addressed the validity of the stop. The trial court then 
limited the State to evidence concerning the stop. See T. 189. 
Defendant insists, nevertheless, that he did not "stipulate" that 
the search was conducted upon his consent. He urges this Court 
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to do what the Court of Appeals would not do. That is to remand 
this case for a hearing to determine that his consent was 
voluntary. This result, however, would reward defendant for 
misdirecting the trial court in the first instance and allow him 
to raise a claim at this late date that he studiously avoided in 
the appropriate stage of the proceeding and overlooks the factual 
finding already entered by the trial court. 
Without ever claiming that his consent to search was 
not voluntarily given, defendant effectively prevented the State 
from presenting evidence on the issue. If defendant had stopped 
there, perhaps his argument on appeal would be well taken. He 
did not, however, stop there. Defense counsel prepared Findings 
of Fact for the trial court in which he included the following: 
18. The Trooper requested permission to 
search the Defendant's vehicle, and the 
Defendant consented to the search of the 
vehicle. 
(R. 53) (emphasis added). On appeal, defendant attempted to 
convince the Court of Appeals that this finding does not mean 
what it says. He claimed that the trial court made no finding of 
voluntariness of the consent. The Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument and this Court should also reject it. The finding of 
the trial court cannot be limited in the manner that defendant 
wishes to limit it. Defendant, in effect, conceded that the 
consent occurred. Without so much as a hint that he did not 
consent voluntarily, he prepared a specific finding that he did 
consent to the search of the vehicle. This finding should be 
read, as the Court of Appeals read it, to include by implication 
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the logical extension of its express terms that the consent was 
voluntarily given. This is a logical conclusion for the Court of 
Appeals to reach because if defendant had argued at trial that 
his consent was involuntary, he would be arguing that it was not 
a consent search. Where, on the other hand, defendant prepared a 
finding of fact stating that he consented, the state, the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals could rightfully conclude that 
defendant conceded the issue. 
Defendant asserts that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals "occurred because of a blurring or imprecise use of the 
word 'consent'." App. Br. at 8. The record is not blurred or 
imprecise. It plainly supports the Court of Appeals' decision 
that defendant conceded the issue of consent. 
Defendant argues further that the trial court made no 
conclusions of law about the issue of consent, therefore, the 
Court of Appeals is incorrect in concluding that the finding of 
fact on the issue controls. This argument is unsupported and 
unfounded. The trial court made no findings on this issue 
because defense counsel was convinced, and convinced the court, 
that the fact of consent was irrelevant where the stop itself was 
unlawful. Thus, that the trial court did not enter any 
conclusions of law on the issue is the result of misapplication 
of the law, not of lack of support for the conclusion. Defendant 
appears to assert that his concession of consent should not be 
enforced because there was no evidence presented on the issue. 
Litigants often stipulate, waive, or concede issues without the 
benefit of record evidence upon which later observers can 
-6-
determine the reason for their actions and courts should not 
allow a litigant's remorse over the concession to control whether 
the litigant will be held to the concession. 
It is understandable that defendant now regrets his 
concession because he recognizes his error in believing that an 
illegal stop always invalidates a subsequent consent search under 
the federal constitution. The Court of Appeals correctly relied 
upon the express findings entered by the trial court rather than 
upon defendant's later claims that he did not intend to close the 
door on other avenues of attacking the search. This Court should 
also find that defendant conceded the issue of consent. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS CONSISTENT 
WITH EXISTING CASE LAW. 
Defendant asserts that his case is "not unlike" that of 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). Contrary to 
defendant's assertion, this case is not like Sierra. Because 
this case is distinguishable from Sierra, the Court of Appeals 
appropriately refused to remand for an evidentiary hearing. 
In Sierra, the court remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of consent because there was no evidence in 
the record on the issue of voluntariness. In that case, unlike 
this case, the trial court did not enter a finding of fact that 
the defendant consented to the search. The appellate court 
remanded Sierra because the police officer had testified that 
Sierra volunteered to let him search, however, the trial court 
had not made any findings on the issue whatsoever nor had Sierra 
conceded the issue of consent. There was also testimony that the 
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drugs were found in another location after an extensive search of 
the interior and other areas of the car. From the record, the 
Court of Appeals also noted that Sierra did not appear to speak 
English well and perhaps could not understand the officer. Thus, 
questions of fact remained as to whether Sierra had consented to 
the portion of the search that revealed the contraband. 
In this case, the trial court specifically found that 
defendant consented to the search. It was, thus, unnecessary to 
remand for an evidentiary hearing even though the record does not 
contain evidence of what defendant said or exactly where the 
officer searched. Here, defendant conceded the issue regardless 
of whether this Court is able to determine the exact facts upon 
which he based the concession. 
Defendant's concession should be interpreted to include 
all aspects of the term "consent." The Court of Appeals simply 
determined that when defendant used that term, he was conceding 
that the consent was voluntary. This determination makes further 
factual development unnecessary since voluntary consent is itself 
an intervening act "sufficiently distinguishable from the primary 
illegality to purge the evidence of the primary taint." United 
States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 315 (1986). For this reason, defendant is 
incorrect in asserting that this Court must remand for a hearing 
to determine if the consent attenuated the taint of the illegal 
8 top. 
In point III of his brief, defendant argues that the 
Court of Appeals decision is inconsistent with case law analyzing 
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the Fourth Amendment. He urges this court to read Carson more 
narrowly than did the Court of Appeals because he claims that 
voluntary consent to search is not of itself sufficient to 
overcome an initially unconstitutional stop. Defendant ignores 
that the Tenth Circuit expressly stated that voluntary consent is 
of itself an intervening act that vitiates the initial illegality 
of the stop. 793 F.2d at 1147-48. Where the fruits of the 
primary illegality (a pretext stop) are not used to coerce a 
defendant into granting consent, then the consent is voluntary 
and the illegal stop is irrelevant. 
Defendant also ignores Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 
(1986) in which the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The state of mind of the police is irrelevant 
to the question of the intelligence and 
voluntariness of [defendant's] election to 
abandon his rights. 
106 S. Ct. at 1141-42. Thus, the focus in a consent search case 
is the defendant's grant of consent, not the request to search or 
the reasons underlying it. This concept is consistent with Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) wherein the Court 
stated: 
We need not hold that all evidence is 
" fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because 
it would not have come to light but for the 
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the 
more apt question in such a case is "whether, 
granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint." 
371 U.S. at 487-88 (citation omitted). Where there is no 
evidence of coercion, defendant's voluntary consent is 
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sufficiently distinguishable from the pretext stop in this case 
to overcome the need for suppression of the evidence. 
Defendant cites Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) 
to support his claim that a consent search is always invalidated 
by an illegal detention. Royer is distinguishable and more 
narrow than defendant asserts. The officers in Royer were found 
to have exceeded the bounds of a permissible stop by engaging in 
activities that coerced defendant into granting his consent to 
search. The officers retained Royer's airline ticket and 
identification while they requested him to accompany them to a 
small room for questioning. They obtained Royer's luggage 
without his permission and then asked to search it. While Royer 
did not object to the search, he merely acquiesced to a coercive 
show of authority. The Court found that such acquiescence was 
not a valid consent. It is likely that, faced with other facts, 
the Supreme Court would find the consent valid. 
There have been no facts established in this case that 
indicate defendant was coerced into granting his consent. Absent 
such facts, the decision of the Court of Appeals is appropriate. 
Defendant also cites cases from other circuit courts of 
appeal that are contrary to Carson. These cases, however, merely 
adopt the Mbut for" causal connection that Carson rejects. See 
United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982), and United 
States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1981). Carson contains 
the much more workable analysis of the Wong Sun standard. The 
Tenth Circuit's analysis should be adopted by his Court on the 
issue of defendant's federal constitutional claim. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE CLAIM THAT THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AFFORDS HIM BROADER PROTECTION 
THAN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. ALTERNATIVELY, 
HIS ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
In the Utah Court of Appeals, defendant contended that 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution affords broader 
protection to citizens than does the United States Constitution. 
As the Court of Appeals noted, however, defendant did not 
articulate what these broader protections are or what is their 
basis. For this reason, the Court of Appeals refused to reach 
the issue. This Court should also refuse to reach the issue 
where defendant failed to make his argument in the court from 
which he appeals. £f. State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984) 
(defendant must have specifically stated to the trial court the 
same grounds for objection to evidence he presents on appeal). 
Alternatively, if this Court reaches the state 
constitutional claim it should decline defendant's invitation to 
expand Article I, section 14 in the manner suggested. That 
section provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
This language does not mandate suppression of the evidence in 
this case and, in fact, supports its admission. By obtaining 
defendant's consent to search his vehicle, the officer avoided 
violating defendant's right to be secure in his effects because a 
consent search is a reasonable search. 
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On the other hand, defendant argues that because the 
initial stop was unreasonable, this Court should hold that a 
subsequent consent to search is always ineffective. On its face, 
defendant's claim that his analysis provides a bright line rule 
is inviting. He argues that officers will avoid stopping 
vehicles unreasonably if the lure of obtaining a later consent to 
search is unavailable. 
On closer inspection, this rule would not provide a 
bright line to officers at the stage where a bright line would 
actually simplify search and seizure rules. It is unrealistic to 
focus on what occurs after the stop when it is the initial 
decision whether to make the stop that creates the most confusion 
for an officer. 
In this case, the lower courts held that the officer's 
decision to stop defendant was pretextual. Although the Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that the officer's own reasons for making 
the stop were irrelevant to its holding, it held that an 
objectively reasonable officer would not have stopped defendant 
under the circumstances. State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 
35 (Utah Ct. App. filed Feb. 15, 1989). The court concluded that 
the officer would not have stopped defendant "except for some 
unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity." Id. 
Conversely, the officer must have thought the stop was reasonable 
since he actually issued a citation for the offense he claimed he 
observed. It is very difficult indeed for officers to determine 
whether they are making an -objectively reasonable" stop for 
legitimate reasons when they also harbor some suspicions of other 
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activities about the subject. A rule requiring suppression of 
evidence obtained after a consent search occurring after an 
unreasonable stop will not make the decision whether to stop an 
individual easier for the officer in the field. It is a fact of 
human frailty that officers will continue to make stops based 
upon a mistaken judgment of legitimacy regardless of whether 
permission to search may later be sought. 
It is actually much more realistic for this Court to 
focus upon the fact of defendant's consent in this case and find 
that a consent search does not violate the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches. It is unlikely that officers would waste 
their time stopping individuals they have absolutely no reason to 
stop merely to ask if they can search the vehicle as defendant 
warns. It is more likely that the desire to investigate other 
suspicions clouds an officer's ability to make an objective 
decision whether to stop. He or she may have difficulty deciding 
in that situation whether the observed driving pattern is the 
reason for the stop or whether their suspicions are controlling. 
For these reasons, a rule of state law that suppresses evidence 
in a case such as this one is unhelpful and this Court would 
better utilize its time finding ways to make the decision to stop 
or not an easier one to make for officers in the field. 
The State is aware that several of this Court's recent 
opinions have suggested that, as has been done in some other 
states with their constitutions' search-and-seizure provisions, 
Article I, section 14 could be construed to expand constitutional 
protection beyond that mandated by the United State Supreme Court 
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under the fourth amendment. State v. Earl# 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 
(Utah 1986); State v. Hyqh# 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring separately). This Court could also 
independently analyze the state provision and conclude that, 
3 
given its similarity to the Fourth Amendment, the Federal 
analysis is well taken and adopt a similar analysis for the Utah 
Constitution. However, the State recognizes that the current 
Court may still give the state provision an independent and more 
protective interpretation in future cases, perhaps adopting the 
following view taken by the Mississippi Supreme Court in a recent 
case: 
We accord to the U.S. Supreme Court the 
utmost respect in its interpretation of the 
U.S. Constitution. We must, however, reserve 
for this Court the sole and absolute right to 
make the final interpretation of our state 
Constitution and, while of great persuasion, 
we will not concede that simply because the 
U.S. Supreme Court may interpret a U.S. 
Constitution provision that we must fie the 
same interpretation to essentially the same 
words in a provision of our state 
Constitution. 
The State has been able to find only a brief reference to 
Article I, section 14 at the Constututional Convention of 1895. 
The following appears to be the entire record of any proceedings 
in that regard: 
The Chariman: Gentlemen, we will take up 
section 14, 
Section 14 was read and passed without 
amendment. 
Official Report of Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 
1895, 319 (1989). The development of Utah's search-and-seizure 
provision prior to the adoption of article I, section 14 reflects 
a steady movement by the drafters toward adoption of the precise 
wording of the fourth amendment. 
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Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983). See also State 
v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 (1986); State 
v. Arrinqton, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1981). 
Nevertheless, the State urges the Court not to lose sight of its 
history of construing Article I, section 14 as providing the same 
scope of protection as the fourth amendment, and the philosophy 
underlying that history. See e.g., State v. Jesso, 21 Utah 2d, 
444 P.2d 517 (1968); State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976). 
It should proceed very cautiously into this new territory. As 
the Vermont Supreme Court correctly stated: 
The development of state constitutional 
jurisprudence will call for the exercise of 
great judicial responsibility as well as 
diligence from the trial bar. It would be a 
serious mistake for this Court to use its 
state constitution chiefly to evade the 
impact of the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court. Our decisions must be 
principled, not result-oriented. Justice 
Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
expressed his concern this way: "[s]tate 
courts should not look to their constitutions 
only when they wish to reach a result 
different from the United States Supreme 
Court. That practice runs the risk of 
criticism as being more pragmatic than 
principled." 
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 235-36 (Vt. 1985) (footnote 
citation omitted). A recent opinion from the New Jersey courts 
echoes this concern: 
There are certain dangers inherent in state 
courts relying too heavily on state 
Constitutions to afford greater protection to 
its citizens. The erosion of national 
constitutional doctrine is one illustration. 
We are therefore mindful of the desirability 
of uniformity between the state and federal 
courts in the interpretation of parallel 
constitutional provisions. Divergent 
interpretations should be avoided unless 
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guidelines such as those discussed in State 
v. Hunt, 91 N.J. at 358-368, 450 A.2d 952, 
justify a departure. 
State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 239-40, 491 A.2d 37, 43 
(1985), aff'd, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987). In the Hunt 
case cited by the Novembrino court, Justice Handler in a 
concurring opinion identified the following criteria for deciding 
whether to interpret the state constitution differently than has 
the federal constitution: (1) textual language; (2) legislative 
history; (3) preexisting state law; (4) structural differences; 
(5) matters of particular state interest or local concern; (6) 
state traditions, and (7) public attitudes. This would be a 
reasonable set of factors for this Court to take into account 
before resorting to independent state constitutional 
interpretation to provide protections that are either less 
expansive or nonexistent under federal constitution. 
It is highly significant that, even after the issuance 
of the "suggestive" opinions in Earl and Hygh, the Court 
continues to rely solely on federal precedent interpreting the 
fourth amendment in deciding search-and-seizure issues, with no 
indication that those issues might be decided differently under 
Article I section 14 or that additional briefing on the state 
constitutional question was necessary. See, e.g., State v. 
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986); State v. Kelly, 718 
P.2d 385, 389-92 (Utah 1986). Cf. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1986) (noting that Hwhat the appropriate remedy might be if 
[the defendant] had argued that the officer's action violated his 
rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution is an 
-16-
open question"). This is not to say that the federal precedents 
in this area must necessarily represent the most satisfactory 
resolution of the issues in all instances, or that alternative 
approaches to search and seizure law should never be considered. 
See Bradley, "Two models of the Fourth Amendment," 83 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1468 (1985) The point is that this Court will often find 
an acceptable resolution of a search or seizure problem in the 
federal case law (on both philosophical and public policy 
grounds), as it apparently did in Banks and Kelly, and therefore 
have no reason to interpret Article I, section 14 differently. 
See, e.g., State v. Quinn, 50 Or. App. 383, 623 P.2d 630, 638-9 
(1981) (adopting federal position for purposes of state 
constitution on search-and-seizure issues); State v. Caraher, 293 
Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942, 948 (1982) (citing cases where the state 
court recognized the possibility of expanding protection under 
the state constitution beyond that required under the federal 
constitution, but declined to take such a step in the given 
case). 
Defendant also suggests that officers be instructed to 
tell people that they are not required to permit a search. This 
suggestion also sounds good at first blush. It, nevertheless, 
has difficulties in application. Officers frequently ask for 
4 
Professor Bradley, in an excellent article, discusses two 
alternative models for clarification of fourth amendment law. He 
argues that adoption of either model would solve many of the 
problems the Supreme Court has had with search-and-seizure issues 
and would change a widely held view that "[t]he fourth amendment 
is the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and 
obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that 
every effort to extract themselves only finds them more 
profoundly stuck." 83 Mich. L. Rev. at 1468. 
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permission to search even where the search may be sustainable on 
probable cause, or even where there is a search warrant. See 
e.g. State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Utah 1987). If 
officers in such a situation inform the suspect there is no need 
to allow the search, the other bases for the search are undercut 
or must be articulated to the individual. This would require 
police officers to be legal scholars and inform a person that 
they do not need to permit a search but that the officer is going 
to search anyway based upon a warrant, and/or probable cause, 
and/or exigent circumstances, etc. Officers would be effectively 
precluded from using the consent search as a back up basis for a 
search. Such an approach is impractical and unworkable. 
Finally, defendant merely assumes that if any of his 
state constitutional arguments are adopted by this Court, 
suppression will result. This Court need not, however, choose 
suppression to remedy a state constitutional violation. Instead, 
this Court could adopt some other remedy it deems appropriate, 
such as civil liability, to discourage violations rather than 
mandating the frustration of prosecution where the evidence 
suppressed is the crucial evidence of criminal activity 
suppression of which will result in dismissal of the case. The 
State urges this Court to consider alternatives other than 
suppression under the Utah Constitution if it finds that 
defendant's separate state constitutional rights were violated. 
Three major rationales for the exclusionary rule in 
search-and-seizure cases have developed in the case law and legal 
literature: (1) the remedial or personal right rationale; (2) 
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would be required for a violation of the provision, this Court 
should again reject the remedial or personal right rationale as a 
constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule, as it did, for 
all practical purposes, in State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P.2d 
704, 706 — 08 (1923). 
The theory that exclusion is necessary to preserve 
judicial integrity has also received much criticism and has 
generally played only a minor role in the development of the 
exclusionary rule. Coe, supra at 17. The notion underlying this 
theory was perhaps best articulated in the dissent of Justice 
Brandels in Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandels, J., dissenting): 
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example. . . . If the 
Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself, it invites 
anarchy. 
In that same case, Justice Holmes wrote in his dissenting 
opinion: 
We have to choose, and for my part I think it 
less evil that some criminals should escape 
than that the Government should play an 
ignoble part. 
277 U.S. at 470. 
Although some courts continue to recognize the judicial 
integrity rationale as the most compelling justification for the 
exclusionary rule, see, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. 
Super, at 244, 491 A.2d at 45, it is subject to the same attack 
as in the personal right rationale—i.e., there appears to be no 
constitutional basis for it, either textually or historically. 
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Leon decision and a number of state court opinions e.g., State v. 
Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986); Stringer v. State, 491 So.2d 
837, 847 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring), reflect the 
majority, and probably better reasoned, view that the deterrence 
rationale, like the other rationales, has no readily discernible 
basis in the federal constitution or the state constitutions. On 
the other hand, Justice Potter Stewart has articulated what is 
perhaps the most compelling counterargument to that view: 
To give effect to the Constitution's 
prohibition against illegal searches and 
seizures, it may be necessary for the 
judiciary to remove the incentive for 
violating it. Thus, it may be argued that 
although the Constitution does not explicitly 
provide for exclusion, the need to enforce 
the Constitution's limits on government—to 
preserve the rule of law-requires an 
exclusionary rule. Under this third 
"doctrinal" basis for the exclusionary rule, 
which has been described as "constitutional 
common law," the exclusion of unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence is not a 
constitutional right but a constitutional 
remedy. It is a right only in the sense that 
every remedy vests a right in those who may 
claim it. 
Stewart, supra at 1384. But even he qualified his argument by 
stating: 
Under such an approach, the determination 
whether the exclusionary rule is 
constitutionally required turns on whether 
there are other adequate remedies available 
to ensure that the government does not 
violate the fourth amendment at its pleasure. 
Id. 
Assuming that this Court is among those courts that see 
deterrence of police misconduct as the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, the Court should explicitly hold that an 
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